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COMMENTS
A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC, A NATIONAL
CONVERSATION, A NATIONAL LAW: IN
SUPPORT OF UNIQUE IDENTIFIER
REPORTING FOR HIV SURVEILLANCE
Kevin M Kramer*
INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) kills.' Once con-
tracted by an individual, the disease's currently incurable state2 will
prove fatal. Testing positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV), the causative precursor to AIDS,4 may, and often does, lead to
J.D. Candidate 2000, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic Uni-
versity of America; B.S. 1994, Crouse-Hinds School of Management, Syra-
cuse University. The Author would like to thank his family, Margaret Hel-
dring, Ph.D., Ruth Fleischer and the editors and staff of THE JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY for their invaluable criticism,
advice, and support.
1. See, e.g., Matthew Warren Grill, Recovery for Emotional Distress Due
to Fear of AIDS: Exposing AIDSphobia in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1009,
1009 (1998) (stating "Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a fatal
disease resulting from the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).").
2. See Howard Zonana, Warning Third Parties at Risk of AIDS: APA's
Policy is a Reasonable Approach, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 162,
164 (1989) ("AIDS is currently an incurable disease."); see also Lawrence 0.
Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate": The Case for National
HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 698 (1998) ("AIDS
remains incurable.").
3. See Robert M. Wachter et al., Critical Care of Patients with AIDS, 267
JAMA 541, 541 (1992) ("AIDS is ultimately a fatal illness.").
4. See Sylvia Mayer Baker, HIV: Reasons to Apply Traditional Methods of
Disease Control to the Spread of HIV, 29 HouS. L. REv. 891, 891 (1992).
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the development of the disease. Yet today, for the first time in the
near two decade-known existence of AIDS, 5 there is considerable hope
that HIV-positive individuals may never reach such a deadly denoue-
ment.
6
Through the combined efforts of public health initiatives and effec-
tive medical treatments, the plight of Americans with HIV is better
than it has ever been.7 The advent of increased pharmaceutical re-
search, heightened public awareness, combination drug therapies with
protease inhibitors, and recuperative medications such as aziothymi-
dine (AZT), all bolster the notion that the virus is treatable.8 Persons
with HIV are living longer, more productive lives while the death rates
of those whose prognosis progresses to AIDS have plummeted in the
last two years.9
Halting the spread of this deadly virus with all available tools is of
utmost concern to public health officials.10 A consensus exists among
5. See Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information:
Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the
AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REv. 111, 118 (1994) ("[Tlhe first cases of AIDS
were reported in 1981.").
6. The author recognizes that HIV/AIDS is a worldwide epidemic. The
disease is ravaging many parts of the world, particularly the third-world coun-
tries of Africa and Asia and nations that continually discriminate against women,
homosexuals, substance abusers and the impoverished. However, for the pur-
pose of this Comment, HIV/AIDS will be addressed solely from an American
legal and epidemiological perspective.
7. See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The
Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7
(1997) (demonstrating that because of various developments in the fight against
HIV and AIDS, the disease that was once considered a "plague" is now more
commonly termed a "chronic disease").
8. See Stacey D. Blayer, But Names Will Never Hurt Me: HIV Surveillance
& Mandatory Reporting, 39 B.C. L. REv. 1175, 1180 (1998). "[C]ombination
drug therapies with protease inhibitors have dramatically improved the health
and prolonged the lives of many HIV-infected individuals." 1d; see also James
Burke, HIV Monitoring Gains Support, THE RECORD, Dec. 8, 1997, at A13.
"Combination-drug therapies - especially a new class of drugs known as 'prote-
ase inhibitors' - have shown promise in many patients." Id.
9. See Burke, supra note 8, at A13. "AIDS deaths declined 23 percent,
from 50,140 to 38,780." Id
10. See id. (quoting Dr. Alonzo Plough, the director of the Seattle-King
County Department of Public Health, "We need to keep our policies in line with
the new scientific evidence that early notifications save lives. [Surveillance] is
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public health officials and AIDS advocacy groups that the increased
improvement in the lives of those with HIV is due predominantly to
more effective medical treatments and not greater preventive meas-
ures." Yet, while the lives of HIV sufferers are improving, the stig-
matized virus 12 continues to spread despite greater awareness. The de-
crease in AIDS cases does not correspond to a proportionate decline in
HIV numbers.' 3 Further, HIV is reaching epidemic proportions among
minorities and women.' 4 Federal and state legislative officials are
continually challenged to implement the best safety measures.
the best way for us to keep track of the epidemic and to make sure individuals
and infected partners have this information.").
11. See Mitch Katz, Names Will Never Hurt? In HIV Reporting, They Can,
S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 28, 1998, at A17. "Powerful HIV therapies have length-
ened the time between initial HIV infection and an AIDS diagnosis for many in-
dividuals." Id.
12. See Baker, supra note 4, at 896. From the beginning of the epidemic,
"HIV was most prevalent among male homosexuals. Thus, those who tested
HIV-positive suffered a dual stigma: they were viewed as suffering from both a
sexually transmissible disease and a gay disease." Id.
13. See National Center for HIV, STD, & TB Prevention, Trends in the HIV
and AIDS Epidemic, 1998 (visited Aug. 31, 1999)
<http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/Trends.htm#A Turning Point in the Epidemic>.
In the past, CDC has primarily reported trends in the epidemic based
on the estimated number of people diagnosed with AIDS each year
(AIDS incidence). Until now, AIDS incidence provided a reliable
picture of trends in the HIV epidemic because researchers could
take into account the time between HIV infection and progression to
AIDS and estimate where and how many new infections were oc-
curring based on observed cases of disease. But with advances in
treatment of HIV, AIDS incidence can no longer be used to reliably
track the path of the HIV epidemic.
Id. at n.1.
14. See New HIV Data Show Impact on Women, Minorities: Numbers Take
on Importance as AIDS Cases Decline, AIDS ALERT, June 1, 1998 [hereinafter
New HIV Data], "When looking at new cases among people aged 13 to 24 years
old, the analysis shows that 63% were African-American, [and] 44% were fe-
male." Also, on October 28, 1998, the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices unveiled a Clinton Administration initiative "responding to HIV/AIDS in
racial and ethnic minority populations." HHS Fact Sheet, Clinton Administra-
tion Initiative to Address HIVIAIDS Among Racial and Ethnic Minority Popula-
tions, Oct. 28, 1998 (visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/981028c.html>. The press release
identified AIDS as the leading killer of African-American men between the ages
of twenty-five and forty-four and the second leading killer amongst African-
American women within the same age range. Id.
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Weighing the rights of individuals against the potential safety of soci-
ety continues to vex judicial officials.
Containment and combative health initiatives perpetually place the
civil liberties of individuals in conflict with traditional public health
measures. 15 Discerning the relationship between the privacy and non-
discrimination rights of patients and the health protections of society
is the most profound issue in the history of public health.16 Perhaps
nowhere in the arena of health law is this issue more pronounced than
in the growing debate over name-based reporting of people with HIV.
In all fifty states and territories, name-based lists are maintained for
people who have contracted AIDS, 7 as well as many other sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs).' 8 However, as treatments become more
effective, those with HIV are living longer and the relevance of using
AIDS statistics to evaluate the epidemic is drastically lower.' 9 To ad-
dress this conundrum, many states are moving toward HIV reporting,
either by name or a system using a numeric or alpha-numeric code
called a unique identifier (UI). 20 Though all factions of the debate -
HIV/AIDS advocacy groups, gay and lesbian alliances, civil libertar-
15. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 681.
16. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & David W. Webber, HIV infection and AIDS
in the Public Health and Health Care Systems: The Role of Law and Litigation,
279 JAMA 1108, 1108 (1998).
17. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 696-97.
18. See List of HIV Patients Raises Privacy Issues in New Jersey, THE
BALTIMORE SuN, Aug. 9, 1998, at 14B [hereinafter List of HIV Patients], ("Few
experts now doubt that such benefits can result from HIV reporting, much in the
way that government tracking of syphilis and tuberculosis cases has gained
widespread acceptance."). See also Baker, supra note 4, at 899 ("Once AIDS is
acknowledged as a public health issue, then the traditional methods of disease
control may be utilized. These methods include mandatory reporting.... The
medical profession has used these methods to combat syphilis, tuberculosis, po-
lio, and other communicable diseases.").
19. See Hearings on HIV Transmission Before the Subcomm. on Health and
Environment of the House Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter
Hearings]. Franklyn N. Judson, M.D. testified, "Attempting to monitor the HIV
epidemic by doing an AIDS body count is like trying to drive a car forward by
looking through the rear-view mirror." Id.
20. See Reporting HIV: Name-based System Is a Necessity, TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 1998, at A6 ("More than 30 states now require doctors to re-
port to health officials the name, age, sex, race and address of any new HIV
cases. A few use coding systems to preserve patient confidentiality.").
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ian organizations, and public health officials - maintain that HIV sur-
veillance is now necessary to attack the epidemic, 2' the debate as to
whether name-based or UI lists are best suited to achieve this goal is
raging.22 While name reporting has proven to be a public health boon
to states that have implemented it,23 there are obvious privacy and con-
fidentiality concerns to be addressed.24
This Comment argues for the reexamination and revamping of
AIDS surveillance in the United States to more effectively combat the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Due to improved medical treatment, current
AIDS reporting represents epidemiological information that, on aver-
age, is ten years after initial infection of HIV.25 This ten year lag rep-
resents a lost opportunity for states to prevent the spread of HIV. Ac-
cordingly, because HIV is demonstrably more treatable if medical care
begins closer to infection HIV, surveillance provides a superior means
to study the virus and improved odds for curing HIV/AIDS. Yet,
proper safeguards to prevent breaches of confidentiality and adequate
federal funding to finance such systems are required. To stem the
spread of HIV/AIDS and protect the liberties of individuals with HIV,
all states should implement a unique identifier reporting system. Con-
sidering all options available, UI reporting is the best means to combat
the disease. To do otherwise will extend the life of the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic, unnecessarily sacrificing thousands of American lives.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of disease surveillance
in the United States and explores various techniques traditionally util-
ized by public health officials to combat widespread epidemics. This
section explains why disease surveillance is necessary and how it his-
torically benefited the United States. It also discusses the swift im-
plementation of national name-based reporting for people with AIDS,
as well as the current shift toward HIV reporting and away from
overly outdated AIDS surveillance. It chronicles the history of HIV
21. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 688.
22. Compare AIDS: The Need to Know, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 16,
1997, at 21, and Stay Focused on Names to Help Track HIV Cases, SEATrLE
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998 at B4, with What's In A Name?, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 1998 at B8.
23. See List of HIV Patients, supra note 18, at 14B. "Public health officials
say that New Jersey offers a textbook case of the value of registries of people
with the AIDS virus." Id.
24. See infra notes 97-145 and accompanying text.
25. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 686.
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surveillance beginning with Colorado in 198526 to the present, in
which thirty-two states 27 maintain some form of HIV reporting.
Part II analyzes the constitutional issues pervading the name-based
debate. It begins by exploring the broad discretion states possess to in-
stitute public health initiatives pursuant to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.28 In Jacobson, the Court "distinctly
recognized the authority of a State to enact . . 'health laws of every
description.,,' 29 Though the decision remains good law, the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut30 recognized individuals' fundamental right
to privacy in certain arenas, thus diluting the sweeping language of
Jacobson. In addition to reconciling Jacobson and Griswold, this Part
examines the possibility of equal protection and substantive due proc-
ess violations through the use of name-based reporting.
Part III assesses the legal and policy considerations which ulti-
mately deem UI reporting the most effective means to administrate
HIV surveillance. Name-based lists used for AIDS reporting began
almost from the disease's inception. Modem advances in medical
treatment and the widespread proliferation of personal data collection
allow for the possibility of states possessing a list of HIV-infected
citizens for decades. Future legislatures could enact laws which di-
vulge this information causing inter alia, the potential for discrimina-
tion in employment, schools, housing, and attaining health insurance.
HIV surveillance utilizing unique identifiers prevents this and negates
the possibility of severe breaches of confidentiality. This Part presents
a case study of UI reporting in Maryland and Texas, two states which
reached different conclusions concerning the benefits of employing
26. See id,
27. See Draft Guidelines for National HIV Case Surveillance, Including
Monitoring for HIV Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Dec. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Draft Guidelines]. The states with confidential name-based HIV infection re-
porting are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. Three states, Connecticut, Texas, and Oregon use name-
based reporting for pediatric cases only. See id.
28. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
29. Id. at 25.
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Unique Identifier Reporting for HIV Surveillance
unique identifiers to track HIV. The Texas and Maryland UI method-
ologies are presented, as are critical explanations of their systems.
Part III also scrutinizes the concerns of AIDS advocacy, civil liberties,
and gay/lesbian organizations regarding HIV surveillance.
Finally, Part IV recommends that the federal government should
pass legislation requiring the implementation of national UI reporting.
This Part proposes a reporting system that could be supported by
members of the public health community, as well as HIV/AIDS advo-
cacy and civil liberties groups. The proposal includes model guide-
lines from which to tailor federal legislation. Implementation of this
system will arguably lead to comprehensive HIV surveillance while
protecting the privacy rights of patients and the confidentiality of
medical records.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
INITIATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Colonial Beginnings Through the Early 1900s
1. Early Reporting of Personal Health Information
The collection, storage, and use of information covering the health
of a state or nation constitutes the core of any public health initiative. 31
The first known example of American disease surveillance began with
a 1741 Rhode Island statute requiring tavern owners to inform local
health authorities about customers known to possess contagious dis-
eases.32 The colony later introduced legislation mandating the report-
ing of such contagious diseases as cholera, yellow fever, and small
pox.
33
By 1850, a report on the correlation between malignancy and dis-
eases and the living conditions of those with the diseases was submit-
ted to the Massachusetts Sanitary Commission.34 The author, Lemuel
31. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Public Health Information Infra-
structure: A National Review of the Law on Health Information Privacy, 275
JAMA 1921, 1921 (1996).
32. See id.
33. See STEPHEN B. THACKER, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 3, 4 (Steven M. Teutsch & R.
Elliot Churchill eds., 1994).
34. See id. at 4.
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Shattuck, urged state-supported reporting of health data "by age, gen-
der, occupation, socioeconomic level and locality. '35 That same year,
the federal government, perhaps taking a cue from England and Wales,
published nationwide data on mortality. 36 Heightened reliance on and
effectiveness of mortality data led to more organized governmental
health departments. Reporting began to expand from end-stage death
statistics to the detection and prevention of diseases.37
By the beginning of the 2 0 th century, the federal government re-
quired all states to report on the incidence of common, deadly, conta-
gious diseases such as small pox and tuberculosis.38 Over time, an ar-
senal of more onerous tactics was implemented across the country.
These techniques ranged from the less vexatious "identifying indi-
viduals infected with an infectious agent, 3 9 to the more severe "iso-
lating and quarantining infected individuals that pose immediate haz-
ards of contagion to others, and discovering and notifying possibly
exposed persons to seek diagnosis and treatment. 4 ° In 1925, mainly
because differing state surveillance techniques created a hodge-podge
patchwork of epidemiological data, all states submitted uniform re-
ports on the occurrence of infectious diseases to the United States
Public Health Service.41 The reports fueled a growing dichotomy be-
tween public health officials' duty to ensure societal safety in pre-
venting disease and physicians' duty to honor the doctor-patient
privilege of non-disclosure of sensitive, personal health information.
35. Id.
36. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 690. William Farr, the Superin-
tendent of the Statistical Department of the General Registrar's Office of Eng-
land and Wales, reported on health data from 1839 to 1879. Id. He commented
that surveillance of mortality matriculation "will be an invaluable contribution to
therapeutics, as well as to hygiene, for it will enable the therapeutics to deter-
mine the duration and fatality of all forms of disease.... Illusion will be dis-
pelled, quackery ... suppressed, a science of therapeutics created, suffering di-
minished, life shielded from many dangers." See id. (citing MILTON J.
ROSENAU, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND HYGIENE 1002 (1917)).
37. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 691.
38. See Gostin et al., supra note 31, at 1921.
39. Doughty, supra note 5, at 118.
40. Id.
41. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 692.
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2. Reconciling the Conflicting Interests of Individuals with Those
of the Greater Population
Public health officials generally perceive their duty as one respon-
sive to the greater good of the population.42 Physicians see their duty
primarily as one maintaining the bond between themselves and their
individual patients. 43 Mandatory reporting requirements, therefore,
while showing the appearance of talismanic preventive power,44 di-
rectly conflict with physicians' obligations under the ancient, yet still
monumentally significant, Hippocratic Oath.45
Initially, doctors adhered to the Oath, stridently opposing the dis-
closure of any kind of personal health information4 6 Over time, this
honorable intention eroded due to the public's wretched disdain for the
minority of the population who contracted certain diseases.4 The
crude viewpoint that "you got what was coming to you" pervaded the
popular, uneducated culture.4 8 This common notion weighed heavily
on physicians who feared the potential legal repercussions of breach-
ing patients' confidentiality or an implied term of contract to protect
medical records, or being found negligent for invasion of privacy.4
Methodically, judicial rulings ° relieved physicians of liability from
42. See id. at 693.
43. See id.
44. See Gostin et al., supra note 31, at 1921. "The eradication of small pox,
one of the 20th century's greatest public health accomplishments, was based ul-
timately on the prompt identification of local outbreaks and the widespread vac-
cination of potentially exposed persons." Id.
45. See Doughty, supra note 5, at 116, n.6. "Whatsoever I shall see or hear
in the course of my profession... if it be what should not be published abroad, I
will not disclose, holding such things to be holy secrets." Id.
46. See id. at 116-17.
47. See Baker, supra note 4, at 896.
48. See id. For instance, "leprosy was seen as God's punishment for vene-
real transgressions. Cholera was punishment for drinking and debauchery."
[Citations omitted.] Id. During the onset of the AIDS epidemic, this fevered,
hostile attitude reappeared as citizens exclusively associated the disease with
homosexual and intravenous drug using populations. See id.
49. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 694.
50. See generally Doe v. Marsh, 918 F. Supp. 580, 586 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
"The qualified immunity defense will protect a state actor from suit if it was ob-
jectively reasonable for that actor to believe that his actions were lawful at the
time of the challenged act." Id.
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such claims and medical reporting proliferated. 5' By the 1960s, while
ethical qualms still bedeviled doctors' collective conscience, halting
the spread of communicable diseases appeared to outweigh individu-
als' interests.52 Today, reporting to state health officials, who in turn
report to their paternal counterparts in the federal government, is
commonplace.
B. Implementing Name-based AIDS Reporting
In 1981, AIDS was first diagnosed in the United States after doctors
observed rare cancers and severe pneumonia among homosexual
men.5 3 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) imme-
diately attempted to combat the spread of the disease by instituting a
nationwide tracking system.54 Name-based reporting, which was and
is still used for a multitude of diseases, including sexually transmitted
ones, 5 was quickly adopted for tracking AIDS in all fifty states. 6
Today, the names and other pertinent information about AIDS pa-
tients, such as age, sex, and ethnicity, are collected locally and sub-
mitted to a state's department of health. This information (absent
patient names or other individually identifying data) is then relayed to
the CDC for national surveillance.5
It may seem curious that gay/lesbian and civil liberties groups, the
same organizations that are a driving force against name-based lists
for HIV surveillance today, were virtually silent in their opposition to
name reporting for AIDS during the early 1980s.5 9 However, these
advocacy groups, particularly gay/lesbian associations, became more
outspoken and organized only after the outbreak of HIV/AIDS. When
51. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 695.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 696.
54. See id.
55. See Burke, supra note 8. "Names reporting has long been used to help
contain and combat... dangerous infections. [Washington] state monitors 54
such ailments including measles, tuberculosis, whooping cough, certain types of
hepatitis, and several sexually transmitted diseases." Id.
56. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 697.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 696 ("Remarkably, while advocacy groups fiercely opposed
HIV reporting, they exhibited little opposition to reporting CDC-defined
AIDS.").
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AIDS was first discovered, patients were primarily diagnosed in the
late stages of the fatal illness when they had fleeting months to live.
Consequently, when judiciaries weighed the privacy rights of indi-
viduals with a fatal disease against the interests of public health offi-
cials to halt the spread of AIDS, the public health perspective won out
handily. Since it was not yet known that persons could live with HIV
before progressing to AIDS (in fact, HIV was not discovered until
1983),60 citizens recognized AIDS as a disease that only afflicted ho-
mosexuals or intravenous drug users. This stigmatization resulted in
AIDS sufferers' inability to find advocates to protect their right to pri-
vacy. Hence, name-based AIDS reporting soon followed in spite of in-
dividual citizens' privacy rights and confidentiality concerns.
As AIDS became a recognized disease and medical research deter-
mined persons carrying HIV could live, even asymptomatically, 61 for
years, surveillance based solely on AIDS became less effective in
tracking the HIV/AIDS epidemic. A transformation to HIV surveil-
lance remains the next logical step. How to accomplish the task re-
mains debatable.
C. The Shift to HIV Surveillance
As stated earlier, advanced medical treatments now allow HIV-
positive individuals to live healthy lives indefinitely without ever
contracting AIDS.62 From the point of infection, HIV actively attacks
the individual's immune system, and only through rigorous therapeutic
maintenance can HIV remain an inactive agent. "Early detection and
treatment is critical to providing individuals infected with HIV the op-
portunity to live longer without visible symptoms. '63 Additionally,
the advances in treatment have greatly diminished the relevance of
AIDS data to accurately represent the incidence of HIV.64 In 1996,
national AIDS death rates fell for the first time since the known in-
60. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 697.
61. See Baker, supra note 4, at 892 ("An HIV-positive individual may re-
main asymptomatic for up to ten years.").
62. But see Baker, supra note 4, at 891 ("[A] person infected with HIV may
become sick and die before developing AIDS."); see also Edward P. Richards,
Communicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach to AIDS, 65
DENv. U. L. REv. 127, 127 n.3 (1988).
63. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 699.
64. See Draft Guidelines, supra note 27, at 1.
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ception of the disease.65 While surely welcome news, this trend did
not correlate to a decrease in HIV incidence. 66 Revising surveillance
to monitor the incidence of HIV among the states can provide an accu-
rate assessment of the disease.
1. How HIV Reporting Is Conducted
Currently there are four means by which individuals may be tested
for HIV. One method is through the purchase of a home test kit.
While "[t]ears, saliva, blood, semen, and vaginal secretions contain
the virus, '67 the most common method for home testing is by pricking
the finger and placing three drops of blood on a piece of testing
paper.68 The tester then mails the card to the testing site. A number is
the only identifying mark accompanying the test and a person can
simply call to receive his or her results via that same number.69 If the
person tests negative, a recorded message provides general informa-
tion.70 If the test proves positive, "a trained counselor comes on the
phone and provides counseling and information concerning possible
retesting, treatment, and the location of medical, legal, and counseling
services., 71 Under this method of testing, no data are recorded or re-
ported to any public health entity. While this method is the most pro-
tective of privacy, it is only available to those who can afford to buy
the test.72
A second method is the use of either an anonymous test site or an
anonymous physician test. At the test site, demographic information is
recorded, such as race/ethnicity, sex, and age. If a person tests positive
65. See id. at "History of AIDS Surveillance."
66. See id. at "Current Status of HIV Surveillance." See also New HIV
Data, supra note 14. ("In contrast to the decline in the AIDS incidence rate, the
data also show that the number of new HIV cases has remained stable.").
67. Baker, supra note 4, at 893.




71. William 0. Fabbri, Comment, Home HIV Testing and Conflicts with
State HIV Testing Regulations, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 419, 420 (1995).
72. During the first half of 1999, home HIV tests cost approximately fifty
dollars in the Washington, D.C. area. This analysis is from the author's inter-
views with pharmacists at ten different pharmacies in Washington, D.C. and
northern Virginia.
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for HIV, the aggregate information is forwarded to public health offi-
cials, absent patients' names.
Under a third method, a person goes to a confidential test site, phy-
sician's office, or hospital and identifying information is collected. In
states that use name-based reporting, demographic information is re-
corded at the test site. If the person tests positive, the recorded data
and the individual's name and address are forwarded to the state
health department. The states, in turn, send this information to the
CDC without names or addresses. However, in states that do not use
name-based reporting, the confidential data may remain at the site,
doctor's office, or hospital. This information could conceivably be
forwarded to the state health department at a future date if that state
later passes legislation requiring data to be recorded retroactively.
Because this confidential information may remain at the physician's
office or test site for an extended period of time, individuals may be
driven to test anonymously or not at all.
73
A fourth method is UI reporting. Under a UI reporting system, the
individual visits a confidential test site, physician's office, or hospital
for testing. The test site does not record the individual's name, but in-
stead creates a UI for the patient. Elements of the numerically coded
UI usually include part of a person's social security number, and codes
for race/ethnicity, sex, and age.74 If the person tests positive, the
demographic data are reported to the county or state health department
by'UI only. The individual's name is never reported to the health de-
partment, but rather stays at the provider level.
As of October 1, 1999, thirty-two states conducted HIV surveil-
lance. 75 Three states, Connecticut, Oregon, and Texas use name-based
73. See Andrew Bindman et al., 280 JAMA 1416, 1416 (1998). Bindman
describes how people with access to anonymous screening for HIV took the tests
sooner and followed up with treatment faster than those who had submitted their
names confidentially. See id. at 1418. Further, patients who had access only to
confidential testing were not screened until they had become sick with the dis-
ease. See id. "Anonymous testing clearly lowers the barrier for people who are
thinking about testing to get tested." Id.
74. For instance, under the Maryland UI reporting system, a twenty-six-
year-old African-American male born on January 1, 1973, with a social security
number of 123-45-6789 who tests positive for HIV may have a UI of
678901017321.
75. See Draft Guidelines, supra note 27 (listing the thirty-two states).
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lists for pediatric cases only.76 Though the number of states conduct-
ing HIV surveillance constitutes nearly two-thirds of the nation, these
states collectively account for only one-third of all AIDS cases re-
ported to the CDC through 1997." Of the ten states with the highest
number of reported AIDS cases, only three, Florida, Louisiana, and
New Jersey, conduct name-based HIV surveillance. The two states
with the highest number of AIDS cases, California and New York, do
not have any kind of HIV tracking at all. 8 Consequently, at present,
only antiquated AIDS reporting is available to study the disease and
HIV infection cannot be tracked on a national scale.
2. Why HIV Reporting is Conducted
In addition to the increasingly outdated nature of AIDS reporting
and its ineffectiveness to track HIV/AIDS, 79 the shift to HIV surveil-
lance is useful on two other fronts: studying the epidemiological and
environmental factors of HIV transmission more effectively and re-
ducing perinatal HIV transmission.
Interest groups most entangled in matters concerning the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, whether they are in favor of name-based or UI
reporting, agree that HIV surveillance is a needed addition to the war
against HIV/AIDS. 80 Disease surveillance "at the earliest stage of de-
76. Oregon requires reporting for HIV-positive children under the age of six
years old. Connecticut and Texas report pediatric cases for children under thir-
teen years of age.
77. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 710.
78. See id.
79. Although AIDS reporting, by itself, is now deemed ineffective to moni-
tor the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it should continue to be an element in the tracking
of the disease. AIDS surveillance still allows state health departments and the
CDC to examine how many citizens are dying from AIDS each year and how
many citizens with HIV are progressing to the terminal illness. "HIV reporting
can be an important component of a comprehensive HIV/AIDS surveillance
system that also includes AIDS reporting, in-depth interviews, medical record
reviews, unlinked seroprevlance surveys, and sampling representative popula-
tions." Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 711.
80. "[R]ecent developments in the AIDS epidemic support the conclusion
that an HIV surveillance system can now better meet the public health needs and
goals than an AIDS surveillance system." Creating an Effective Public Health
Response to the Changing Epidemic: Moving to HIV Surveillance by Unique
Identifier and Other Non-Name Based Surveillance Systems. (A paper prepared
in October 1997 in collaboration between the AIDS Action Committee of Mas-
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velopment is not unusual, but is standard public health practice
grounded in historical epidemiology for all other significant infectious
diseases."
8'
a. The Benefactors of Effective HIV Surveillance
Tracking the prevalence of HIV benefits all entities involved with
IV: public health departments, health care providers, health insurance
companies, and most importantly, patients and their loved ones.
Through early detection, local, state, and federal health departments
can study the disease by observing how an individual's health re-
sponds over time after beginning a course of medical treatment. By
reporting HIV incidence, health officials can determine which com-
munities have a high rate of HIV and then concentrate educational
seminars, free HIV screening, condom distribution, and needle sharing
programs to those communities.8 2 By implementing proactive meas-
ures and providing funding with government health expenditures, bet-
ter treatments and increased scientific research can move towards a
cure. 83 Purposeful testing and reporting also assist health care provid-
sachusetts and the AIDS Action Counsel of Washington, D.C.); "The develop-
ment of a national HIV surveillance system is a public health priority. Unless
surveillance systems are revised, health authorities.., will not have reliable in-
formation about HIV prevalence, the number of new cases diagnosed each year,
[or] recent or anticipated trends in HIV infection." CDC Update: The Role of
HIV Surveillance as US. Enters New Era in the Epidemic, January 1998. Mitch
Katz, M.D., head of San Francisco's Department of Public Health, commented
in an editorial appearing in the San Francisco Examiner, "Powerful HIV thera-
pies have lengthened the time between initial HIV infection and an AIDS diag-
nosis for many individuals. The result is that thousands of Californians who are
HIV-positive, but not diagnosed with AIDS, are missed by our current reporting
system since it does not track HIV." Katz, supra note 11.
81. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 711.
82. HIV/AIDS "is only transmitted via sexual contact (anal, vaginal, and
oral), exposure to contaminated blood, or from mother to fetus. Blood transmis-
sion of HIV occurs most often through needle-sharing between intravenous drug
users, although it also occurs between health care providers and their patients."
Baker, supra note 4, at 893 [Citations omitted.]
83. See Sandra Elizabeth Stone, Note, HIV Testing and Insurance Appli-
cants: Exploring Constitutional Alternatives to Statutory Protections, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1163, 1164 (1992). "In a country with no national
health care system, the financial burden of AIDS falls primarily on three major
groups: individuals with AIDS who have neither private insurance nor Medicare
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ers. A decreased rate of HIV means fewer people need treatment,
physicians and care providers can assist other patients, and fewer hos-
pital hours are spent with HIV sufferers.
Health insurance companies paying for expensive medications and
treatments for those with HIV have a large stake in the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Increasingly competent HIV reporting systems are likewise
to the companies' collective benefit. At the core of any health insur-
ance policy existing between an individual and a plan is a binding
contractual agreement. This obligation requires a person to pay peri-
odic installments and premiums to the company84 in return for a
promise that if certain medical circumstances occur, the insurance
company will pay for the medical bills. Healthy plan holders mean
fewer financial outlays for the company. Because HIV surveillance
can assist in decreasing the rate of HIV, insurance companies gain
monetarily when surveillance is effective.85
Finally, patients and their loved ones are at the heart of early testing
and confidential HIV surveillance. While HIV in the United States
remains predominantly a syndrome of the gay and intravenous drug
using communities, the disease can, and does, afflict people from all
walks of life, regardless of sexual orientation or drug use. For this rea-
son, periodic testing ensures that if one does contract HIV, early
medical treatment can begin immediately and provide the patient the
greatest chance at a healthy life. Surveillance of the epidemic allows
public health agencies to identify the best treatments. This information
can, in turn, be shared with physicians who can prescribe effectual
medical care to those with HIV. Yet, as addressed later in this Coin-
or Medicaid, government programs, and private insurance companies." Id. See
also Nancy Perkins, Prohibiting the Use of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Antibody Test by Employers and Insurers, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 279-83
(1988).
84. See Blayer, supra note 8, at 1169 (maintaining that premium rates are
calculated by weighing different demographic and risk factors of the individual
such as age, sex, occupation, or smoking habits).
85. Insurance companies have had a intense interest in HIV testing since
testing was introduced in 1985. Insurance groups certainly have a fiduciary in-
terest, and perhaps even a duty, in charging higher rates for persons more sus-
ceptible to sickness. Most states generally allow insurers to test for HIV, but the
test results are closely regulated. Among the factors considered in making
regulations are: confidentiality of test results, cost of screening, and nondis-
crimination in providing insurance. See id. at 1168-69.
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ment, high quality surveillance and strict confidentiality of all per-
sonal HIV data must remain of the utmost importance.
b. Perinatal Transmission of HIV
Perinatal transmission of HIV is "the vertical transmission of HIV
from an HIV-positive pregnant mother to her unborn fetus or infant
child during birth"86 and constitutes the primary method in which pe-
diatric cases of HIV arise.8 7 Screening women before they become
pregnant provides the greatest incentive to shun unprotected inter-
course for HIV individuals, if not for the criminal liability that may
result from knowingly transmitting HIV, 8 then for the risk of bearing
an HIV-positive child. When HIV surveillance is used in tandem with
partner notification, pregnant women possibly exposed to the virus by
their partner can be tested immediately. If these women test positive,
they may begin medical treatment to help prevent perinatal transmis-
sion of HIV.
Although it is unclear whether transmission takes place during
pregnancy, delivery, or breastfeeding after birth,89 and which factors
86. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 701.
87. See Pamela J. Boyer et al., Factors Predictive of Maternal-Fetal Trans-
mission of HIV-i: Preliminary Analysis of Zidovudine Given During Pregnancy
and/or Delivery, 271 JAMA 1925, 1925 (1994) (positing that mother-fetus or
mother-infant child transmission accounts for the most predominant means by
which pediatric HIV cases occur).
88. On March 13, 1997, Rep. Tom Coburn (R-OK) sponsored a bill entitled
the "HIV Prevention Act of 1997" which included a requirement of informing
individuals who may have been exposed to HIV to be notified by a state public
health official. See H.R. 1062, 105th Cong. (1997). Encompassed in the legis-
lative language was a sense of the Congress that, "individuals with HIV disease
have an obligation to protect others from being exposed to HIV by avoiding be-
haviors that place others at risk of becoming infected. The States should have in
effect laws providing that intentionally infecting others with HIV is a felony."
Id. at § 2(5). "[I]t is a felony for the individual to infect another with HIV if the
individual engages in the behaviors involved with the intent of so infecting the
other individual." Id. at § 4. This bill was designated to the House Committee
on Commerce on March 13, 1997, which referred it to the Subcommittee on
Health and Environment eight days later. It was never voted on before the con-
clusion of the 105th Congress. At the present time, similar legislation has not
been introduced during the 106th Congress.
89. See Sheldon H. Landesman et al., Obstetrical Factors and the Transmis-
sion of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I from Mother to Child, 334 NEW
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increase the chances of transmission,9" there is approximately a fifteen
to thirty-five percent chance of transmission if no medical intervention
takes place.91 However, studies of perinatal treatment show that AZT
reduces the risk of perinatal transmission to roughly eight percent.
92
Avoidance of birth by cesarean section and postnatal breastfeeding
may also decrease the likelihood of transmission to the child.93
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE HIV SURVEILLANCE
DEBATE
The Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts94 discussed the
states' broad police power to protect the public from disease. In
Jacobson, a Massachusetts man challenged a state statute requiring all
adults to be vaccinated for smallpox 95 after he refused to comply with
the requirement. Justice Harlan wrote for the majority of the Court
stating,
this court has refrained from any attempt to define the
limits of [the police] power, yet it has distinctly recog-
nized the authority of a State to enact quarantine laws
and 'health laws of every description[.]' . . . According
to settled principles the police power of a State must be
held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will
protect the public health and the public safety.
96
Under this decision, states are conceivably given free reign to es-
tablish public health programs "of every description" to combat dis-
ease provided the regulations are reasonable. More recent decisions
ENG. J. MED. 1617, 1617 (1996) (stating that most transmissions occur near de-
livery).
90. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 701. "Causes of vertical transmis-
sion of HIV involve many factors, including the mother's stage of infection and
characteristics of the viral strain, incidents during delivery, and whether the
mother breastfeeds." Id
91. See Catherine Peckham & Diana Gibb, Mother-to-Child Transmission of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 298, 298 (1995).
92. See Rhonda S. Sperling et al., Maternal Viral Load, Zidovudine Treat-
ment, and the Risk of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I
from Mother to Infant, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1622-23 (1996).
93. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 703.
94. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
95. See id. at 14.
96. Id. at 25.
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discussed infra attempted to decipher the extent to which state regula-
tion remained constitutional.
A. The Right to Privacy in One's HIV Status
1. Griswold v. Connecticut
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly establish
an individual's right to privacy, this does not mean that such a right
does not exist.97 The Supreme Court gleaned a right to privacy vis-A-
99vis the penumbras of the Bill of Rights9" in Griswold v. Connecticut. .
The landmark Griswold majority interpreted the First, 00 Third,'0 '
Fourth,'0 2 Fifth,'0 3 and Ninth'" Amendments to provide a privacy right
97. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961). Justice Harlan broached
this tenet that not all liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are explicitly listed
in the Constitution. In his dissenting opinion in Poe, Harlan stated:
[The] full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited- by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of [specific guar-
antees]. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, in-
cludes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and pur-
poseless restraints.
Id. at 543.
98. See id. at 484-85.
99. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (providing in pertinent part, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.").
101. U.S. CONST. amend. III. (providing in pertinent part, "No solider shall,
in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
102. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (stating, "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause.... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.").
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (setting forth, "No person shall.., be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
104. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
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for citizens.
In 1965, the Griswold Court held that a Connecticut statute prohib-
iting married couples from using contraception violated their right to
privacy.10 5 The lower courts deemed the Executive Director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut to be an accessory to a
married couple.10 6 The Executive Director challenged the accessory
statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 7  The Court
ruled that although it was not a "super-legislature"' 08 which delves
into the reasoning behind a particular statute, it was clear that the
Court shall protect certain fundamental rights, even if those rights are
not explicitly stated in the Constitution.'0 9 The Court cited examples
such as the right of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's asso-
ciations,""10 the right to educate a child in the school of the parents'
choice,"' and the right to study a foreign language."
2
people." Id
105. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 486.
106. The section of the statutes in controversy were §§ 53-32 and 54-196 of
the General Statutes of Connecticut (since repealed). Section 53-32 stated: "Any
person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
Id. at 480. Section 54-196 provided, "Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principal offender." Id
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law- nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id
108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
109. See id. "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or
social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id
110. Id. at 483 (citing NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1965)).
111. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
112. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court acknowledged
other fundamental rights in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
and Skinner v. Okalahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Aptheker, the Court recog-
nized the fundamental right to travel by invalidating a provision denying pass-
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Balancing one's privacy interest against the state's police power to
invade the marital bedroom, the Court held the Connecticut statute un-
constitutionally violated the right of privacy."' Pursuant to Griswold,
a privacy right clearly exists within the marriage relationship." 4 How
far this privacy right extends remains unclear.
2. Whalen v. Roe
Whalen v. Roe"l5 addressed the issue of whether New York in an
attempt to prevent an illegal drug market, could require a computer-
ized record of the names and addresses of all persons taking certain
medications." 6 In Whalen, patients and physicians brought suit to
enjoin enforcement of the statute. The state countered that the statute
responded to growing problems of stolen or forged prescriptions, pa-
tients attaining the same prescriptions from multiple doctors, and
pharmacists negligently refilling prescriptions without checking to see
how many times they were refilled. 1' 7 The district court held that the
statute intruded upon "the doctor-patient relationship [which] is one of
the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protection,"'1 8 and that
the law interfered with this zone with "a needlessly broad sweep."" 9
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding, "the State's vital interest in
controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs would support a deci-
sion to experiment with new techniques for control .... It follows that
ports to Communist Party members. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505. The Court
held that the statutory provision "too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the
right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment." Id. In Skinner, the Court recognized the fundamental right to procreate
and marry. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. "We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.... Any experi-
ment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever de-
prived of a basic liberty." Id. But see, Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1122,
1126 (1978) (holding a Florida statute which required financial disclosure state-
ments by individuals running for state senate was constitutional, thereby refusing
to establish a fundamental right to run for office).
113. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
114. See id. at 485.
115. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
116. See id. at 591.
117. See id. at 592.
118. Id. at 596.
119. Id.
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the legislature's enactment of the patient-identification requirement
was a reasonable exercise of New York's broad police powers."'
120
Using the reasonable basis test, the Court declined to recognize the sa-
cred doctor-patient relationship as a fundamental right. In balancing
the privacy interests of New Yorkers taking medication against the
state's interest in quelling what it considered a widespread abuse of
prescription drugs, the Court recognized two different interests. "One
is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and [the other] is the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions.'' 2 '
The Court made two points in Whalen that resonate in the HIV sur-
veillance debate today. First, the Court concluded that the mere pos-
sibility that security breaches of medical information may occur is not,
on its face, enough to find the statute unconstitutional. 22 Second, the
Court acknowledged that some New York citizens may avoid or post-
pone seeking medical attention due to the concerns of stigmatization
and privacy.' 23 Yet, the Court stipulated that disclosure of medical in-
formation is a part of modern medicine, "even if this information
could reflect poorly on the character of the patient."'' 24 Further,
"[riequiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having re-
sponsibility for the health of the community, does not automatically
amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy."' 25 Thus, future liti-
gants arguing a name-based HIV reporting program may not rely
solely on the fact that future confidentiality breaches may occur.
3. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,126 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit balanced the privacy in-
terests of employees in their medical records against the public inter-
120. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
121. Id. at 599-600.
122. See id. at 597, n.20 (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) that "[T]his Court has the power to
prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on
the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreason-
able.").
123. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 595.
124. Id. at 602.
125. Id.
126. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
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est of improving occupational health and safety.127 After receiving a
request for a health hazard evaluation from an employee of Westing-
house, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) requested access to the company's employee medical rec-
ords to determine if anyone had been exposed to dangerous chemicals
at the plant.1 28 The district court held that, under Whalen, public inter-
est granted NIOSH the authority to view medical records. 29 The court
of appeals affirmed, but provided strong language respecting the depth
of the right to privacy.
Recognizing that the right to privacy is "one of the most funda-
mental and cherished rights of American citizenship,', 3 0 and that "an
employee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to pri-
vacy protection,"'13 1 the court held that, in this instance, the societal
interest in disclosure outweighed the employee's privacy interests.
3 2
To balance similar warring interests in future cases, the Westinghouse
court provided seven factors to consider in deciding whether disclo-
sure of personal information is justified: (1) the type of record re-
quested, (2) the information it does or may contain, (3) the potential
for harm by subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, (4) potential injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated,
(5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (6)
the degree of need for access, and (7) whether there is a statutory
mandate, public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
127. See id. at 572.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 573. See also E. I. DuPont de Nemars & Co. v. Finkler, 442 F.
Supp. 821 (S.D. W.Va. 1977) (upholding an agency's authority to view medical
records needed in the public interest).
130. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
131. Id. at 577. The court provided poignant language on the details of pri-
vacy. Two examples on the level of privacy in medical disclosures help clarify
admittedly muddy waters.
We may not mind that a person knows a general fact about us, and
yet feet our privacy invaded if he knows the details. For instance, a
casual acquaintance may comfortably know that I am sick, but it
would violate my privacy if he knew the nature of the illness. Or a
ood friend may know what particular illness I am suffering from,
but it would violate my privacy if he were actually to witness my
suffering from some symptom which he must know is associated
with the disease.
Id. at n.5. (citing Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,483 (1968)).
132. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578, 580.
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toward access. 33 These seven factors may be particularly relevant if
lawsuits questioning HIV surveillance, specifically name-based re-
porting, are initiated in the future.
4. Into the 1990s
Two recent federal cases, both out of New York, concentrated on
the complex issue of whether an individual has a constitutional right to
privacy in one's HIV status. In the 1994 case, Doe v. City of New
York, 34 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that persons do indeed have such a right.13  When the City of New
York publicly revealed details of a discrimination suit settlement with
Delta Airlines based on an employee's HIV-positive status, the plain-
tiff alleged a violation of his right to privacy. In ruling for the plain-
tiff, the court reasoned that because of its personal nature, the right to
privacy includes an individual's right to avoid disclosure of one's
health status. 136 The ruling has special importance for those infected
with HIV or AIDS because revealing one's HIV/AIDS status poten-
tially creates great stigmatism, vigilantism, intolerance, and discrimi-
nation.
137
While City of New York held there is a constitutional right to confi-
dentiality in one's HIV/AIDS status, Doe v. Marsh138 held it is a con-
ditional right which may be overcome by (1) the government's interest
in having or using the information 139 or (2) a waiver of the right via an
individual's prior disclosure of his or her HIV status.1 40 In 1992, the
New York State Education Department published an HIV awareness
document entitled, "Setting Up HIV Prevention Programs Including
Persons Living With HIV/AIDS.,' 4' The document contained the full
names of individuals living with HIV, including those of the two
plaintiffs (one male and one female). The plaintiffs argued that while
both were active in the HIV/AIDS advocacy community, neither of
133. See id.
134. 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
135. See id. at 267.
136. See id
137. See id.
138. 918 F. Supp. 580 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
139. See id. at 585.
140. See id. at 586.
141. See id. at 583.
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them waived their right to privacy in their HIV status.142 The defen-
dants disputed the factual nature of this claim and argued that regard-
less of the plaintiffs' disclosure or nondisclosure, they were entitled to
qualified immunity from suit because the right to privacy was not
well-settled at the time the events took place. 143 After weighing these
factors, the court held that at the time of the events, it was clear the
right to privacy was not absolute.'" The court stated it was unclear
what exactly constitutes a waiver of a right to privacy under New
York law, but found the actions of the two plaintiffs would allow a
reasonable person to deem that they had waived their rights.
145
B. Equal Protection Claims for Persons with HIV
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
146
commands that states treat similarly situated people in a similar
way.147 States are given deference when classifying citizens in drafting
legislation, whether by race, sex, or sexual orientation, but may not do
so arbitrarily. The Supreme Court has established three standards of
review for equal protection claims: (1) strict scrutiny, where a gov-
ernment action must be necessarily related to a compelling interest;
(2) heightened or intermediate review, when an action must be sub-
stantially related to an important government interest; and (3) a ra-
tional basis test, where an action must be rationally related to a legiti-
mate interest. 48 Laws regarding individuals with AIDS or who are
142. See id. Plaintiffs argued they had never disclosed their full names and
panel discussions they participated in regarding HIV/AIDS were not open to the
public. Id.
143. See Doe, 981 F. Supp. at 583. The court recalled language from Whalen
(as to the two kinds of privacy interests individuals possess), Westinghouse (that
medical records contain personal facts and are within the ambit of materials en-
titled to privacy protection), and Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y.
1988) (which stated that "[tihere are few matters of a more personal nature, and
there are few decisions over which a person could have a greater desire to exer-
cise control, than the manner in which he reveals [his HIV status] to others.").
See id.
144. See Doe, 918 F. Supp. at 587.
145. See id.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
147. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 83 (1911).
148. See generally, GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628-916 (13th ed. 1997).
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HIV-positive will most likely be evaluated using the rational basis
test, that is, whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.
1. A Rational Basis Test for Sexual Orientation Classification
In 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that a Colorado constitutional
amendment denying individuals who are "homosexual, lesbian, or bi-
sexual' ' 149 any legislative, judicial, or civil rights protections, violated.
the Equal Protection Clause. In Romer v. Evans,'51 the Court ex-
plained that where a law neither hinders a fundamental right nor im-
plicates a suspect class, a state statute will be upheld if it is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. 52 The Colorado amendment,
however, imposed serious discriminating practices upon the
gay/lesbian/bisexual population, a single group of citizens, and thus
did not even meet the rational basis test standard.
53
In relation to how this decision could affect a suit against a state's
HIV surveillance program, it would probably be of little help. The
Colorado constitutional amendment explicitly named homosexuals,
lesbians, and bisexuals in its language, thus separating this identifiable
group from other such populations. A name-based HIV reporting sys-
tem, in all likelihood, would not expressly state that HIV-positive ho-
mosexuals must have their names reported to the state health depart-
ment while HIV-positive heterosexuals do not. If it did, such a statute
would not surpass the rational basis test. The goal of any HIV preven-
tion program is to stop the spread of the virus, not just stop the spread
of the virus in the heterosexual community. Hence, though Romer v.
Evans deems legislative action specifically denying gay, lesbian, or
bisexual rights unconstitutional, it appears that any future action
would probably have to explicitly name homosexuals or bisexuals to
fail the rational basis test.
2. A Rational Basis Test for Health Status Classification
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the 1998 case Middlebrooks v.
149. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
150. See id. at 624-25.
151. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
152. See id. at 631. Respondents did not argue that they had a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual or bisexual activity. Id.
153. See id. at 635.
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State Board of Health,15 4 held that Alabama's statute requiring name-
based reporting for individuals with HIV/AIDS did not violate af-
flicted persons' right to privacy or equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 155 In Middlebrooks, the Alabama health de-
partment brought suit against Dr. Mark Middlebrooks, a doctor spe-
cializing in infectious diseases, for failing to report the names and ad-
dresses of HIV-positive individuals. 156 Dr. Middlebrooks countered
with two arguments. First, he argued the statute mandating name-
based reporting violated his patients' right to privacy in their
HIV/AIDS status. Second, because manufacturers of confidential HIV-
testing kits are similarly situated to him, but do not have to report
names oraddresses, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
157
Citing Whalen and the Westinghouse factors, the court ruled "the pre-
vention of the spread of HIV and AIDS is a legitimate governmental
interest, and ... the State can require disclosure to representatives of
the State having responsibility for the health of the community, and
that the disclosure required ... does not amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy."'' 58 Regarding the Equal Protection challenge, the
court held that out-of-state testing laboratories are not similarly situ-
ated to in-state physicians who test for HIV/AIDS. The court empha-
sized that out-of-state testing labs do not know the identity of the per-
sons being tested and the kit manufacturers do not know the identity of
those purchasing the kits. Hence, the Supreme Court of Alabama held
that the state's name-based reporting statute violated neither HIV-
positive persons' right to privacy nor physicians' rights under the
Equal Protection Clause.
This ruling clearly strikes against future litigants who may chal-
lenge name-based reporting statutes. As long as the state and/or fed-
eral legislation provides adequate confidentiality provisions, a court
applying the Westinghouse factors in a right to privacy claim will
probably rule in favor of sustaining the statute. Further, the final fac-
tor, "[w]hether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated pub-
lic policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward ac-
154. 710 So. 2d 891 (Ala. 1998).
155. See id. at 891-92.
156. See id. at 891.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 892.
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cess," 59 appears broad enough to allow a name-based reporting sys-
tem.
The Equal Protection Clause may provide a stronger argument. In
Middlebrooks, the court only analyzed the different treatment of an in-
state physician against an out-of-state laboratory to determine if the
entities were "similarly situated.', 60 The court stated that the Equal
Protection Clause does not necessarily require that a statute apply
equally to all persons. 61 The court left for another day the determina-
tion of whether an in-state doctor and an in-state lab or vendor are
"similarly situated."
C. A Substantive Due Process Claim on the Basis of HIV Status
Another possible claim in a suit against an invasive HIV surveil-
lance system arises from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 62 This type of argument, however, will probably prove
fruitless. The Due Process Clause is cited when the Court addresses
fundamental rights of individuals. As previously discussed, the Court
recognizes the right to privacy, to marry, to procreate, to learn a for-
eign language, and for parents to send their children to private school
as fundamental rights.' 63 Presumably the right to contract HIV could
be argued as a fundamental right, though it would most certainly be a
tough argument to make and probably be an unpersuasive one. To find
a fundamental liberty, the Court has set as a standard those rights
which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "nei-
ther liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed," or those
typified as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'
' "
Clearly, having a disease does not go to the core of ordered liberty and
such liberty would still exist if citizens did not have the disease. Fur-
ther, assuming arguendo that it did, since AIDS was first discovered
159. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
160. Middlebrooks, 710 So. 2d at 892.
161. See id. at 893 (citing McClendon v. Shelby County, 484 So. 2d 459, 464
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985)).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The author recognizes that future liti-
gants may argue other constitutional claims not raised in this Comment. This
Comment does not mean to present an exhaustive list of arguments, but only
those arguments individuals challenging an HIV surveillance program might
bring forward.
163. See supra, notes 97-145 and accompanying text.
164. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
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in 1981 and HIV in 1983, HIV/AIDS status is certainly not rooted in
the United States' history and tradition. Arguing a fundamental right
to privacy of medical records will also prove unhelpful when consid-
ering the Westinghouse factors. Given these past cases, the Supreme
Court is very reluctant to recognize new fundamental rights.1 65
III. NAME-BASED VERSUS UI-BASED HIV REPORTING
SYSTEMS
HIV reporting, to be successful, must respect individuals' privacy
without significantly limiting the utility of surveillance. Public health
authorities must follow the least intrusive disclosure principle. Under
this principle, the information disclosed must be the narrowest in
content, least identifiable, and presented to the fewest number of per-
sons as reasonably necessary to achieve the stated purpose. Most
public health authorities, gay/lesbian and HIV/AIDS advocacy organi-
zations, and civil liberties groups agree that HIV reporting is an im-
portant public health objective. 166 Under debate is the means by which
HIV reporting should be accomplished: by name or unique identifier.
Name-based reporting relies on the disclosure of an individual's name,
address, and other identifying characteristics. Reporting by unique
identifier strips identifying information from a reporting record, rely-
ing instead on a numeric or alpha-numeric code to report cases of HIV
infection. Considering constitutional and public policy arguments in
their totality, UT reporting provides the best means to implement HIV
surveillance.
165. See id. at 194. Justice White, writing for the Court in Bowers, indicated
that the Court is not
inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover
new fundamental rights iibedded in the Due Process Clause. The
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.... There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach
of those Clauses.
Id. at 194-95.
166. See Lynda Richardson, AIDS Group Urges New York To Start Reporting
of H.l.V., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at Al (announcing the new position of the
nation's leading AIDS service agency, which now supports confidential report-
ing of HIV-positive individuals to the state health department).
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A. Lessons From Texas and Maryland
1. A Texas-sized Debate
In January 1998, the Bureau of HIV and STD Prevention (Bureau)
of the Texas Department of Health (TDH) recommended a change in
the reporting of HIV infection in Texas from a UI system to a name-
167based system. More than 4,000 letters were mailed out by the TDH
inviting citizens to participate in five public meetings in February
1998.168 In response to this invitation, the Bureau received letters, e-
mail messages and telephone calls with comments from advocacy
groups, providers of HIV services, legislators, members of the af-
flicted communities, and public health workers. 169 Though no consen-
sus arose as to which type of HIV surveillance system should be used
in Texas, 170 the TDH decided to propose a name-based reporting sys-
tem for HIV infection.1
7 1
Citizens and advocacy groups within the state expressed several
concerns during TDH's notice and comment period. One concern was
that implementation of name-based HIV reporting would cause a de-
crease in testing. 172 Several groups worried that name-based reporting
would deter groups such as immigrants, the disenfranchised, women,
gays, lesbians, bisexuals, substance abusers, and persons from rural
areas from testing. Responding to this concern, the TDH recom-
mended that anonymous testing remain available to Texas citizens.
173
Current law in Texas now mandates that all publicly-funded HIV cen-
ters provide both confidential and anonymous testing options. 74 The
TDH stated that this policy would not change in the future. Based on
the public outcry in Texas, it is evident that any state choosing to im-
167. See Texas Department of Health, Named HIV Infection Reporting Sum-
mary of Community Input and TDH Viewpoint, June 26, 1998, at 1 (visited No-
vember 1, 1998)
<http://www.serve.com/texasAIDSnetwork/PublicPolicy/CommunityRespons
e.htm> [hereinafter Texas Department of Health].
168. The meetings were held in Austin (2), Arlington, Houston, and Lubbock.





174. See Texas Department of Health at 2-3.
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plement HIV surveillance must make anonymous testing for
HIV/AIDS a component in the system.
The availability of anonymous testing is a necessary element for
any state choosing to track the HIV/AIDS epidemic. While it be-
hooves states to count as many HIV-infected citizens as possible in its
registry, a far greater concern is ensuring that individuals are not dis-
couraged from being tested. The purpose of HIV reporting is not to
count every last infected person, but rather to compute reliable preva-
lence and incidence rates in communities. If a state employs a combi-
nation of name-based reporting and anonymous testing, it will provide
reliable HIV data and promote testing among all of its citizens.
2. A Fair Assessment
Those participating during the comment period raised concerns that
neither the length of time nor the government funds allocated to build
Texas' UI-based reporting system were adequate to provide the state
with a fair assessment of its utility. 75 The TDH responded that the UI
system lasted for four years, a period long enough to adequately re-
view how well or poorly the system worked. 7 6 Furthermore, TDH
considered the level of funding from state and federal programs suffi-
cient to manage UI surveillance. 77 Based on these factors, TDH con-
cluded the UI-based reporting system would not have been more suc-
cessful had there been more funding178
Four years and four million dollars, on the surface, may appear to
be an adequate amount of time and investment to allow for an honest
review of the UI-based system. Yet, a larger issue to address is that
time is of the essence in combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Texas
state health officials argued that it would not serve the needs of the
HIV-afflicted community to discover in four years time that yet an-
other experimental system did not work, thereby leaving Texas with
outdated, incomplete data. A UI system, even if begun from scratch,
seemingly would not take four additional years to implement and ade-
quately assess. Texas health officials believed that a new U-based
strategy would take this long to appraise, yet shockingly did not raise
the same concerns about waiting this long to evaluate a new name-
175. See id. at 9.
176. See id
177. See id. at 10.
178. See id.
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based system. Because Texas already experimented with UI-based
surveillance, the Bureau and TDH should build upon its experiences
instead of scrapping the program entirely. An adequately funded UI-
based system using state and federal dollars would not take four addi-
tional years to review. An effective HIV UI-based reporting system
could, and should, result.
3. Security and Confidentiality of HIV Data
The biggest concern addressed during TDH's comment period was
the lack of a guarantee that data collected would be secure. 179 Under-
standable arguments were put forward stating that discrimination
would be rampant in Texas. 180 For example, health insurance compa-
nies could choose not to insure HIV-positive individuals. Apartment
buildings and real estate brokers could shun potential renters or buyers
of residences if an individual's HIV status was known. Employers
could deny offers. Immigration officials could work to deport legal
immigrants. Further, family and friends who may not be privy to a
relative's condition could gain access to this information and ostracize
him or her.' 8 '
The TDH conceded it is impossible to guarantee that unauthorized
releases of HIV information will never happen. 82 Prior handling of
sensitive medical information in Texas supports the notion that
breaches of confidentiality are extremely unlikely. Yet, this does not
mean breaches may never occur. The TDH maintained name-based
public health reporting systems for AIDS since 1983 without a single
breach attributable to the AIDS surveillance system in Texas.'83 How-
ever, with HIV-positive individuals' ability to live with the virus for
decades, the possibility that breaches could occur would also exist for
decades. Additionally, there is no guarantee future lawmakers would
not pass legislation to reveal the identities of HIV-positive citizens.




183. See id. at 5-6.
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B. The Maryland Experiences
1. Maryland's Methodology
Since June 1, 1994, Maryland has utilized a UI system to conduct
HIV surveillance that continually undergoes evaluation and refine-
ment.'84 Maryland reporting encompasses a six-part system: (1) the
health care provider, be it a private physician, test site, or hospital,
sends a blood sample to a laboratory test after creating a UI; (2) the
lab sends the UI report form to the State AIDS Administration if the
result indicates an HIV-positive outcome; (3) the Maryland AIDS
Administration looks to see if the twelve-digit UI matches any other
UT in the State AIDS Registry; (4) the Administration maintains the
Registry and determines new HIV cases; (5) if necessary, Administra-
tion staff members call physicians to obtain additional information,
such as clinical status and risk category, but names and addresses are
not divulged; and (6) the Registry is periodically forwarded to the
CDC for national surveillance without names or addresses.185
2. Completeness of Records
A common criticism of UI-based surveillance is that the numbers
that make up the UI are not easily attained, specifically the social se-
curity number of the person being tested. 8 6 Many patients may be ap-
prehensive to divulge these private numbers, thus creating an incom-
plete UI number. During the first six months of Maryland's experience
with the UI system, UI forms were sixty-one percent complete, but
improved to seventy-seven percent during the last six months of
1996.187 The Maryland AIDS Administration believes that it will im-
184. See The Maryland Lesson: Conducting Effective HIV Surveillance with
Unique Identifiers, December 1997, at 1 (visited November 1, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/aids/mdnamereport.html> [hereinafter The Mary-
land Lesson].
185. See id.
186. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 2, at 739-40 (noting that Texas and
Maryland did not provide the four-digit social security component of the UI in
approximately twenty-two percent of the cases reported). But see id. at 712.
("[W]e continue to have reservations about named-based HIV reporting. The
benefits of HIV reporting are not always clear, and the potential for violation of
individual rights remain[s].").
187. See The Maryland Lesson, supra note 184, at 3. From the first six
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prove further upon the seventy-seven percent completion rate. In a
pilot program, staff members at all confidential testing sites were
trained to improve the state's completion data. After completion of the
training sessions, UI completeness statistics improved to a 96.6 per-
cent. These statistics demonstrate UI -systems can work effectively
when proper education is provided. Such training could be imple-
mented in all states that choose to use UI-based reporting, rendering
UI surveillance the superlative means by which to track HIV inci-
dence.
IV. A COMPROMISE STATUTE
This Comment supports UI-based HIV reporting, but whether states
should implement a UI-based or name-based system does not have to
be a polarizing issue. Middle ground exists that could bring about an
appropriate medium agreeable to public health officials, HIV/AIDS
and gay/lesbian advocacy groups, and civil liberties organizations.
This section attempts to bridge the current chasm between the two
factions by suggesting model federal, statutory guidelines which sup-
port UI-based reporting and provide the necessary precautions to make
these guidelines effective.
A. Provide for Anonymous Testing
HIV/AIDS is a nationwide concern. This medical condition affe cts
all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation, gender, or use of
narcotics.188 Although advances in medical treatment have reduced
new AIDS cases and AIDS death rates, this improvement on the AIDS
front has not been seen on the HIV front. Proper safeguards to protect
confidentiality of persons' HIV/AIDS status must be included to en-
sure that a proper federal UI-based surveillance bill is passed into law.
Any Congressional bill should encourage states to create or main-
months in 1994 to the last six months in 1996, all components of the UI im-
proved as to completeness: social security reporting from 69.6% to 84.5%, date
of birth from 95.2% to 98.8%, sex from 96.8% to 99.4% and race/ethnicity from
61.3% to 76.5%. See id.
188. See New HIV Data, supra note 14 ("When looking at new cases among
people aged 13 to 24 years old ... [m]ore than one-quarter (26%) of the cases
were from heterosexual transmission, 31%.from men having sex with men, and
6% from injection drug use.").
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tain sites where individuals can receive anonymous HIV tests. 9 Of-
fering such testing opportunities will "provide another route of access
to the health system and encourage a slice of the population that has
steered away from the system to enter it."' 190 This opportunity meets
the public.health imperative that people potentially exposed to HIV
will have ready access to testing, and if necessary, treatment.
It would be best if every person who tested for HIV did so at a con-
fidential test site. This would allow for the best tracking of the virus
19
and allow states to implement education seminars, condom distribu-
tions, needle exchange programs, and other public initiatives best tai-
lored to combat the epidemic. 92 Although privacy and confidentiality
breaches by states with UI-based lists are rare, 193 keeping anonymous
testing sites open would alleviate this anxiety of those being tested. 94
B. Partner Notification Qualifications
When a person tests positive for HIV, health workers should en-
courage him or her to divulge the names of any individuals that person
.may have infected. The health worker can then contact those people
.and urge them to be tested. Yet, mandating that a person divulge these
names could clearly drive HIV underground and completely under-
mine the goal of the legislation: to have as many citizens as possible
be tested for HIV. Guidelines reconciling privacy fears with public
health concerns can be crafted.
189. See Doughty, supra note 5, at 179.
190. Id.
191. See AIDS: The Need To Know, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at
21 ("[The prestigious New England Journal of Medicine is urging mandatory
reporting. Such a policy, it says, will increase the chances that those infected
with HIV will get early treatment. Like syphilis and gonorrhea, HIV is a com-
municable, sexually transmitted disease and should be reported to state health
officials, just as those diseases are.").
192. See Privacy in H.I. V. Reporting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at A30 ("A
national reporting requirement would allow authorities to track the disease bet-
ter, target prevention services to vulnerable populations and allocate medical re-
sources more effectively.").
193. See Stay Focused on Names to Help Track HIV Cases, SEATrLE TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1998, at B4 ("That sort of grotesque tampering with confidential infor-
mation would not be tolerated.").
194. See Privacy in HI. V. Reporting, supra note 192 ("Unless confidentiality
can be guaranteed, a reporting requirement will very likely deter people from
being tested and seeking medical care.").
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Federal partner notification guidelines should be established with
state adherence to these guidelines required to receive federal funding
for HIV surveillance programs. 9 5 Such specifications should mandate
the anonymity of HIV-positive individuals when other persons are
contacted. 9 6 Partner notification programs could ensure this by guar-
anteeing that those charged with notifying others do not have access to
the name of the patient who identified the possibly infected person.
197
Many reasons exist for taking this precaution. There is the obvious
rationalization that HIV-positive persons would not want their names
divulged to the public, even if the public in this instance is one part-
ner. Two examples include the threat of violent retaliation against the
person who infected someone or a jilted individual possibly sending
an anonymous letter to an HIV-positive individual's neighbors, fam-
ily, co-workers, landlord, or health insurance plan. Discrimination and
stigmatization could easily follow causing the irreparable harm to the
person who initially disclosed the name.
Lastly, of course, HIV/AIDS can be contracted from heterosexual
sex or a tainted blood transfusion, but unprotected homosexual inter-
course, particularly between gay men, and the sharing of needles dur-
ing intravenous drug use present more common threats of contracting
the virus. If partner notification is part of any UI-based HIV reporting
bill, a caveat must be included granting immunity to any person con-
tacted by a health care worker from any drug possession or archaic
state sodomy law. Again, this provision would help to ensure the
greatest number of individuals come forward voluntarily for HIV
testing.
V. CONCLUSION
Better medical treatments are causing the number of AIDS deaths to
rapidly decrease and those infected with HIV are living longer lives.
Attention must now turn, along with heightened medical research to
produce a cure, to greater preventive measures to halt the continued
spread of the AIDS virus. A chief objective in the United States must
be to institute the most efficient and effective means to combat the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, while remaining conscious of the privacy and
confidentiality rights of individuals. Doing so works to prevent the
195. See Doughty, supra note 5, at 180.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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spread of HIV, while protecting HIV-positive persons from vigilan-
tism as well as from the potential of discrimination in the workplace,
in attaining housing, or while acquiring health insurance. When pri-
vacy guarantees are implemented and state systems are adequately
funded, UI-based HIV reporting surveillance currently provides the
best means to stem the tide of HIV transmission. Collaboration be-
tween HIV/AIDS advocacy groups, public health officials, and Con-
gressional leaders is necessary. Through the combined efforts of these
entities, UI-based reporting provides the best chance that HIV/AIDS
can be eradicated.

